A teoria da implicatura constitui o principal legado de Paul Grice aos modernos estudos da pragmática linguística. Embora associado à filosofia da linguagem ordinária, seu pensamento não se apresenta marcado pela aversão à sistematização teórica que, segundo se diz, caracterizou essa corrente filosófica. Pelo contrário, a obra do filósofo inglês, apesar de dispersa em artigos só postumamente reunidos em livro, constitui um esforço coerente e rigoroso de analisar os princípios que explicam o comportamento racional do homem. Este ensaio oferece uma (...) tentativa de interpretação da análise que ele propôs para o fenômeno da implicatura, buscando integrar tal análise, progressivamente, ao quadro mais geral de sua filosofia da linguagem e de sua psicologia filosófica. De passagem, é sugerida uma aproximação, quanto aos propósitos, entre o programa filosófico de Grice e certa ensaística crítica do poeta argentino Jorge Luis Borges, sugestão talvez surpreendente, mas que pode se mostrar instrutiva. (shrink)

Política y perdón / Jacques Derrida / - Hacia una cultura del perdón / Christian Schumacher / - La práctica del perdón en el judaísmo, el cristianismo y el Islam / - Alfredo Goldsmith / - La cultura del perdón como factor de construcción social / Oscar Lara Melo / - Venganza y transformación. Notas para una antropología de la venganza / Roberto Pinesa Camacho / - Venganza y cultura en Bogotá / Arturo Laguado / - El perdón jurídico (...) a la luz de la constitución colombiana y del derecho internacional / Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra / - El perdón entre razón y no razón / Darío Botero / - La ética del perdón / Camila de Gamboa / - La obligación moral de recordar / Pablo de Greiff / - Perdón y proceso de reconciliación / Jorge Orlando Melo / - Castigo, perdón y reconciliación : el caso de Sudáfrica / David Crocker / - Una opinión pública sólida para la reconciliación y la reconstrucción nacional / Fabio López de la Roche / - Proceso de paz y construcción de región / Francisco de Roux / - Lo públ... (shrink)

A la hora de pensar lo más inmediato a nosotros mismos es necesario acudir a lo que somos en cuanto Dasein. Sin embargo, la experiencia de lo inmediato tiene la condición de presentarse bajo la forma de un extrañamiento, un «no saber». Se verá que la corporeidad y su extrañamiento abren a la posibilidad de una hermenéutica de nuestra propia condición porque la experiencia de lo Unheimlich es una vía de epojé que «detona» (revienta) la cadena de significaciones habitual y (...) reconfigura la experiencia. Se tomará como punto de referencia cuatro casos icónicos: 1) la convalecencia de Oliver Sacks, 2) el famoso caso Paul Schreber, 3) la referencia al joven esquizofrénico en los Seminarios de Zollikon, e incluso 4) el desfallecimiento de Heidegger entre los años 1945 y 1946, todo esto a la luz del extrañamiento de lo íntimo y la posibilidad que este abre a un «reordenamiento interno». En definitiva, las patologías y lo terrorífico que las acompaña son capaces de generar las condiciones de un vitalismo inusitado, pues solo quien se ha enfrentado a la más radical convulsión de todas sus verdades, podrá «abrirse camino» en medio del exceso de donación que desborda su «realidad». (shrink)

Despite mounting evidence that abusive supervision triggers interpersonal aggression, much remains unknown regarding the underlying causal mechanisms within this relationship. We explore the role of turnover intentions as a mediator in the relationship between abusive supervision and subsequent supervisor-rated interpersonal aggression. We use a sample of 324 supervisor–subordinate dyads from nine organizations and find support for this mediation effect. Furthermore, we find that power-distance orientation and perceived human resource support climate, as important boundary conditions, independently interact with abusive supervision to (...) weaken this positive impact on turnover intentions, thereby reducing interpersonal aggression. We also find via turnover intentions that abusive supervision intensifies interpersonal aggression among high power-distance-oriented individuals when the HR support climate is perceived to be low. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

This article analyses the phenomenon of ‘micro-domination’, in which a series of dominated choices are individually inconsequential for a person’s freedom but collectively consequential. Where the choices concerned are objectively inconsequential, micro- domination poses a problem for ‘objective threshold’ accounts of domination which either prioritise particularly bad forms of domination or exclude powers that do not risk causing serious harm to their victims. Where the choices concerned are subjectively inconsequential to the victim, micro-domination poses a problem for the common republican (...) strategy of creating arenas of contestation for victims of domination, which rely on victims objecting strongly enough to a dominating relationship to sound the alarm. This kind of invigilation may systematically fail victims of micro-domination. Throughout the article, I suggest some ways of better accounting for and responding to cases of micro-domination. (shrink)

The therapeutic misconception has been seen as presenting an ethical problem because failure to distinguish the aims of research participation from those receiving ordinary treatment may seriously undermine the informed consent of research subjects. Hence, most theoretical and empirical work on the problems of the therapeutic misconception has been directed to evaluate whether, and to what degree, this confusion invalidates the consent of subjects. We argue here that this focus on the understanding component of informed consent, while important, might be (...) too narrow to capture the ethical complexity of the therapeutic misconception. We show that concerns about misplaced trust and exploitation of such trust are also relevant, and ought to be taken into account, when considering why the therapeutic misconception matters ethically. (shrink)

When people understand a counterfactual such as “if the flowers had been roses, the trees would have been orange trees,” they think about the conjecture, “there were roses and orange trees,” and they also think about its opposite, the presupposed facts. We test whether people think about the opposite by representing alternates, for example, “poppies and apple trees,” or whether models can contain symbols, for example, “no roses and no orange trees.” We report the discovery of an inference‐to‐alternates effect—a tendency (...) to make an affirmative inference that refers to an alternate even from a negative minor premise, for example, “there were no orange trees, therefore there were poppies.” Nine experiments show the inference‐to‐alternates effect occurs in a binary context, but not a multiple context, and for direct and indirect reference; it can be induced and reduced by prior experience with similar inferences, and it also occurs for indicative conditionals. The results have implications for theories of counterfactual conditionals, and of negation. (shrink)

The present article aims to utilize some insights from behavioral and happiness economics to discuss the consequences that the introduction of an unconditional basic income to cope with technological unemployment may hold for well-being. The impact of 21st-century technological progress on employment has only just begun to make itself felt and it will take time to realize its full extent. However, the main innovation is already common knowledge: robots are finding their way into the production process. According to several recent (...) contributions, the phenomenon is radically different from past technological revolutions and could generate high levels of unemployment, calling for innovative redistributive public policies. The present article, building on Keynes’ short essay and referring to some of the principles and models of behavioral and happiness economics, focuses on the best-known of these policies, namely provision of an unconditional basic income. A series of factors – loss aversion and hedonic adaptation, the impossibility of escalating to higher-grade consumption behaviors, social interaction in the form of active and passive envy, loss of self-esteem and social stigma – are all likely to have a negative impact on well-being if an unconditional basic income that remains unchanging over time is implemented. A policy mix combining a rising basic income with other measures is therefore proposed. (shrink)

In this article, we draw upon the Conceptual Profile Theory to discuss the negotiation of meanings related to the energy concept in an 11th grade physics classroom. This theory is based on the heterogeneity of verbal thinking, that is, on the idea that any individual or society does not represent concepts in a single way. According to this perspective, the processes of conceptualization consist of the use of a repertoire of different socially stabilized signifiers, adjusted to the context in which (...) they occur. We start by proposing zones of a conceptual profile model for energy, each zone being characterized by its own commitments and identifiable by certain modes of talking about energy. Based on classroom evidence, we claim that teachers and students negotiate meanings that interpenetrate the domains of everyday and scientific knowledge. Being inevitable and necessary, this heterogeneity of conceptual thinking needs to be considered in teaching design in order to allow its awareness on the part of the students. We argue that students’ conceptual development goals should be considered in terms of general goals of science education, which points to the need of overcoming the encapsulation of scientific school knowledge. We show that the Conceptual Profile Theory provides a basis for science education that can promote the crossing of cultural boundaries, seeking relations between science and the spheres of everyday life. (shrink)

We examine two competing effects of beliefs on conditional inferences. The suppression effect occurs for conditionals, for example, “if she watered the plants they bloomed,” when beliefs about additional background conditions, for example, “if the sun shone they bloomed” decrease the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens (from “the plants did not bloom” to “therefore she did not water them”). In contrast, the counterfactual elevation effect occurs for counterfactual conditionals, for example, “if she had watered the plants they would (...) have bloomed,” when beliefs about the known or presupposed facts, “she did not water the plants and they did not bloom” increase the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens. We report six experiments that show that beliefs about additional conditions take precedence over beliefs about presupposed facts for counterfactuals. The modus tollens inference is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain additional conditions (Experiments 1a and 1b). The denial of the antecedent inference (from “she did not water the plants” to “therefore they did not bloom”) is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain alternatives (Experiments 2a and 2b). We report a new “switched‐suppression” effect for conditionals with negated components, for example, “if she had not watered the plants they would not have bloomed”: modus tollens is suppressed by alternatives and denial of the antecedent by additional conditions, rather than vice versa (Experiments 3a and 3b). We discuss the implications of the results for alternative theories of conditional reasoning. (shrink)

This article analyses the phenomenon of ‘micro-domination’, in which a series of dominated choices are individually inconsequential for a person’s freedom but collectively consequential. Where the choices concerned are objectively inconsequential, micro-domination poses a problem for ‘objective threshold’ accounts of domination which either prioritise particularly bad forms of domination or exclude powers that do not risk causing serious harm to their victims. Where the choices concerned are subjectively inconsequential to the victim, micro-domination poses a problem for the common republican strategy (...) of creating arenas of contestation for victims of domination, which rely on victims objecting strongly enough to a dominating relationship to sound the alarm. This kind of invigilation may systematically fail victims of micro-domination. Throughout the article, I suggest some ways of better accounting for and responding to cases of micro-domination. (shrink)

Este artículo busca avizorar, desde el terreno de las pretensiones del humanismo, la posibilidad de una ética desprovista de «centro» que se asiente en la «compasión». Se buscará comprender la necesidad de abandonar los intentos de retornar al proyecto «humanístico» y se señalará su mayor riesgo: el «cínico ilustrado». Adicionalmente, se considerará «el humanismo» como el solemne destello de una «estrella que murió hace mucho» pero que da señales para la construcción de una ética excéntrica fundada en la compasión y (...) el dolor. Para tales efectos, se presentarán tres secciones: a) el humanista un cínico ilustrado b) mecanismos de evasión. La miseria y el modo de vida burgués y c) la ausencia de centro y la posibilidad de una ética excéntrica. (shrink)

La meritocracia es sinónimo de conocimientos o prácticas, que se jerarquizan y estratifican de acuerdo a principios de excelencia y competencia, dirección y capacitación, para la toma de decisiones. Una sociedad o institución es meritocrática, en la medida que se orienta por valores de máxima ..

En este artículo se planteará, siguiendo a Heidegger, que el nihilismo, lejos de ser una consecuencia devastadora del tiempo de crisis es más bien una donación de este que posibilita realmente el acontecimiento del «pensar». En ese horizonte de significación se examinarán los orígenes de la palabra nihilismo y se abordará el nihilismo como espacio que prepara el acontecimiento del despliegue [Entfaltung] del ser. Por último, se estudiará brevemente la frase de difícil interpretación «solo un dios podrá salvarnos» pronunciada por (...) Heidegger en una entrevista en la revista Spiegel. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta algumas considerações do pensador italiano Gianni Vattimo acerca da religião na idade contemporânea. O referido filósofo tem como base de suas reflexões a ideia de uma filosofia pós-moderna que se caracteriza pela desconstrução da metafísica da tradição moderna. Nesse sentido, o autor visualiza nas filosofias de Nietzsche e Heidegger a inauguração de uma nova orientação do pensamento ocidental, marcada por esse rompimento com as filosofias totalizantes e pela consideração do ser como resultado das circunstancias eventuais que compõem (...) a experiência existencial. A religião, por sua vez, não acompanhou tal movimento, mas conservou um pensamento marcado ainda pela estrutura da metafísica tradicional, por isso, não se encontra em condições de responder às atuais demandas deste mundo plural. O autor sinaliza para a necessidade da abdicação das estruturas dogmáticas e dos fundamentalismos da religião como meio para a abertura ao diálogo inter-religioso e intercultural. (shrink)

Universal basic income is increasingly proposed as a simple answer to the problem of domination at work—one policy whose knock-on effects will transform the balance of power between workers and employers. I argue against such ‘UBI-first’ approaches. Compared to UBI proposals for other purposes, a UBI sufficient or near-sufficient for minimising domination at work would be especially demanding in two ways. First, the level of the grant would be more demanding compared to UBIs suitable for other purposes, in order for (...) workers to be able to credibly threaten to leave their jobs. Secondly, the maintenance of the grant must also meet strict criteria. The demanding level of the grant must be effectively secured against reduction, allowing workers to plan on its long-term acceptability; and in order to avoid increased state domination it must assume the status of an entitlement rather than a gift that may be withdrawn, through stabilisation against political change or some other means. These difficulties render UBI-first approaches doubtful at best, and an unhelpful distraction from other, more fruitful strategies at worst. (shrink)

It is argued here that bioethicists might inadvertently be promoting genetic determinism: the idea that genes alone determine human traits and behaviours. Discussions about genetic testing are used to exemplify how they might be doing so. Quite often bioethicists use clinical cases to support particular moral obligations or rights as if these cases were representative of the kind of information we can acquire about human diseases through genetic testing, when they are not. On other occasions, the clinical cases are presented (...) in simplistic ways that portray genetic testing as yielding information more accurate than it actually is. It is concluded that, because of the problematic implications that the ideology of genetic determinism might have for individuals’ wellbeing and for our public policies, bioethicists should be careful to present these issues in ways that do not promote questionable ideas about the causal role of genes in human diseases and behaviours. (shrink)

We report five experiments showing that the activation of the end-terms of a syllogism is determined by their position in the composite model of the premises. We show that it is not determined by the position of the terms in the rule being applied (Ford, 1994), by the syntactic role of the terms in the premises (Polk & Newell, 1995; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990), by the type of conclusion (Chater & Oaksford, 1999), or by the terms from the source premise (...) (Stenning & Yule, 1997). In our first experiment we found that after reading a categorical premise, the most active term is the last term in the premise. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4 we demonstrated that this pattern of activity is due to the position of the concepts in the model of the premises, regardless of the delay after reading the premises (150 or 2000 msec) or the quantity of the quantifiers (universal or existential). The fifth experiment showed that the pattern switches around after participants evaluate a conclusion. We propose that the last element in the model maintains a higher level of activity during the comprehension process because it is generally used to attach the incoming information. After this process, the first term becomes more active because it is the concept to which the whole representation is referred. These results are predicted by the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), but not by the verbal reasoning theory (Polk & Newell, 1995), the graphical methods theory (Yule & Stenning, 1992), the attachment-heuristic theory (Chater & Oaksford, 1999), or the mental rules theory (Ford, 1994). (shrink)

While various definitions of moral distress have been proposed, some agreement exists that it results from illegitimate constraints in clinical practice affecting healthcare professionals’ moral agency. If we are to reduce moral distress, instruments measuring it should provide relevant information about such illegitimate constraints. Unfortunately, existing instruments fail to do so. We discuss here several shortcomings of major instruments in use: their inability to determine whether reports of moral distress involve an accurate assessment of the requisite clinical and logistical facts (...) in play, whether the distress in question is aptly characterized as moral, and whether the moral distress reported is an appropriate target of elimination. Such failures seriously limit the ability of empirical work on moral distress to foster appropriate change. (shrink)

The argument from inductive risk has been embraced by many as a successful account of the role of values in science that challenges the value-free ideal. We argue that it is not obvious that the argument from inductive risk actually undermines the value-free ideal. This is because the inductive risk argument endorses an assumption held by proponents of the value-free ideal: that contextual values never play an appropriate role in determining evidence. We show that challenging the value-free ideal ultimately requires (...) rejecting this assumption. (shrink)

Philosophers of science, particularly those working on science and values, often talk about the need for science to be socially responsible. However, what this means is not clear. In this paper, we review the contributions of philosophers of science to the debate over socially responsible science and explore the dimensions that a fruitful account of socially responsible science should address. Our review shows that offering a comprehensive account is difficult. We contend that broad calls for socially responsible science that fail (...) to attend to relevant dimensions are not the solution, as they preclude meaningful changes to research institutions and practices. We conclude that narrower, more explicit accounts are more likely to lead to substantive transformation. (shrink)

The lack of public support for climate change policies and refusals to vaccinate children are just two alarming illustrations of the impacts of dissent about scientific claims. Dissent can lead to confusion, false beliefs, and widespread public doubt about highly justified scientific evidence. Even more dangerously, it has begun to corrode the very authority of scientific consensus and knowledge. Deployed aggressively and to political ends, some dissent can intimidate scientists, stymie research, and lead both the public and policymakers to oppose (...) important public policies firmly rooted in science. -/- To criticize dissent is, however, a fraught exercise. Skepticism and fearless debate are key to the scientific process, making it both vital and incredibly difficult to characterize and identify dissent that is problematic in its approach and consequences. Indeed, as de Melo-Martín and Intemann show, the criteria commonly proposed as means of identifying inappropriate dissent are flawed and the strategies generally recommended to tackle such dissent are not only ineffective but could even make the situation worse. -/- The Fight Against Doubt proposes that progress on this front can best be achieved by enhancing the trustworthiness of the scientific community and by being more realistic about the limits of science when it comes to policymaking. It shows that a richer understanding of the context in which science operates is needed to disarm problematic dissent and those who deploy it. This, the authors argue, is the best way forward, rather than diagnosing the many instances of wrong-headed dissent. (shrink)

La perspectiva que estudiantes de docencia tienen sobre las disciplinas inherentes a la educación y en el logro del perfil de egreso, es multifacética; hay quienes conciben con mayor peso la psicología, didáctica y filosofía, otros incluyen sociología y antropología, pero pocos incluyen la neuropedagogía; por lo que dicha visión poco incide en decisiones para emocionar el cerebro para aprender.

Although science is our most reliable producer of knowledge, it can also be used to create ignorance, unjustified doubt, and misinformation. In doing so, agnotological practices result not only in epistemic harms but also in social ones. A way to prevent or minimise such harms is to impede these ignorance-producing practices. In this paper, I explore various challenges to such a proposal. I first argue that reliably identifying agnotological practices in a way that permits the prevention of relevant harms is (...) more difficult than it might appear. I focus on an identifying criterion that many find apt for the task: bad faith motives. I then consider an objection—that reliable criteria are unnecessary to successfully address the concerns raised by agnotological strategies—and I show that it fails. I conclude by exploring other ways of conceptualising the problems attributed to agnotological practices. In particular, I challenge the focus on misinformation as the main problem of concern. (shrink)

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